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1 Introduction
In standard possible worlds semantics, propositions are sets of possible worlds. To
believe a proposition is to believe that your world is one of the worlds in that set. So
the proposition that there are extraterrestrials is the set of worlds in which there are
extraterrestrials, and to believe that there are extraterrestrials is to believe that your
world is a member of that set.
A belief in a proposition is a belief about what the world is like. But in addition
to beliefs about what the world is like, there are beliefs about where one is in the
world. David Lewis (1979) has argued that these beliefs can’t be expressed in terms
of possible worlds. To accommodate beliefs about where we are in the world, Lewis
proposed to extend standard possible worlds semantics by introducing centered worlds,
possible worlds paired with individuals and times. A set of centered worlds is a centered
proposition.1 To believe a centered proposition is to believe that your current centered
world is one of the centered worlds in that set. So the centered proposition that it’s 9
am is the set of centered worlds at which it’s 9 am, and to believe that it’s 9 am is to
believe that your current centered world is a member of that set.
Following Lewis, call beliefs that can be expressed in terms of possible worlds de
dicto beliefs, and beliefs that can be expressed in terms of centered worlds de se beliefs.
In his paper Lewis raises the question of what happens to Bayesian decision theory when
we consider de se beliefs instead of de dicto beliefs. His answer is a natural one:
“Very little. We replace the space of worlds by the space of centered worlds, or by
the space of all inhabitants of worlds. All else is just as before.”2
However, this answer is untenable. When you update your beliefs using standard
Bayesian conditionalization your certainties are permanent: if you’re certain a proposi-
tion is true before updating then you’ll be certain it’s true after updating. So on the
account Lewis suggests, if you’re certain that a centered proposition is true you will
always remain certain that it’s true. But suppose you’re looking at a clock you know is
accurate. If the clock reads 9 am, then you’re certain of the centered proposition that
it’s 9 am. Given Lewis’ suggestion, since you’re certain of the centered proposition that
1Lewis himself calls them properties.
2Lewis (1979), p. 149.
1
it’s 9 am when the clock reads 9 am, you should always remain certain that it’s 9 am. So
you should remain certain that it’s 9 am a minute later, when the clock reads 9:01 am.
Obviously, this is not how our beliefs should be updated.3 We need a more sophisticated
dynamics of de se beliefs.
Lewis (2001) himself employs a more sophisticated dynamics in his discussion of the
sleeping beauty case. This case raises precisely the issue of how de se beliefs should
change over time. By looking at the different treatments of the case, we can gain insight
into the dynamics of de se beliefs. In this paper I’ll look at three accounts of the sleeping
beauty case: an account proposed by Adam Elga (2000), an account proposed by David
Lewis (2001), and a third account I’ll defend in this paper.
I’ll offer two reasons for preferring my account over theirs. First, every account
of what our credences should be must accommodate the temporal continuity of our
credences. I’ll show that the dynamics I propose accounts for this continuity naturally.
This is not the case for the dynamics favored by Elga and Lewis. Second, I’ll argue that
Elga’s and Lewis’ treatments of the sleeping beauty case lead to highly counterintuitive
consequences. I’ll show that the account I offer also leads to consequences that some may
find counterintuitive, but I’ll argue that they’re not as bad as those of Elga’s account,
and no worse than those of Lewis’ account.
There are several other considerations that can be used to assess the merits of these
accounts, such as betting arguments, considerations regarding reflection, etc. These
issues are important, and have been addressed in a number of places.4 They are beyond
the limited scope of this paper, however, and I won’t look at them here.
The rest of this paper will proceed as follows. In the next section I’ll look at some
natural dynamics for de se beliefs. In the third section I’ll discuss the temporal continuity
of beliefs, and I’ll show that the dynamics I propose can account for this continuity
naturally, while the dynamics of Elga and Lewis cannot. In the fourth section I’ll
present the sleeping beauty case and sketch the three responses to it. In the fifth and
sixth sections I’ll look at Elga’s and Lewis’ responses in detail, and show how they both
lead to counterintuitive consequences. In the seventh section I’ll critically examine my
account by looking at some consequences of it that might also seem counterintuitive. In
the eighth section I’ll sum up my conclusions.
2 Belief Dynamics
It’s standard to assume that belief is not an all-or-nothing affair, but rather admits of
degrees. A subject’s beliefs are represented by a probability function over the space
of possibilities. The function assigns values between zero and one to regions of the
space, representing the subject’s confidence that some possibility in that region obtains.
3Arntzenius (2003), Halpern (2004) and Hitchcock (2004) have noted this problem of extending
standard conditionalization to de se beliefs.
4For a sampling of this literature, see Elga (2000), Lewis (2001), Arntzenius (2002), Dorr (2002),
Arntzenius (2003), Halpern (2004) and Hitchcock (2004). The article by Halpern is especially relevant
to this paper, as he defends an account similar to the account defended here. As a result, much of what
he says, such as his treatment of betting arguments, reflection, etc., applies to my account as well.
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The values it assigns are countably additive: the value of the union of countably many
non-overlapping regions of the space is the sum of the values of each of these regions.
The value it assigns to the entire space of possibilities is one, representing the subject’s
certainty that some possibility or other obtains.
In the case of de dicto beliefs, the space of possibilities is the space of possible
worlds. The credence function takes worlds as arguments, and assigns to each world a
degree of belief, or credence. The credence assigned to a proposition is the sum of the
credences assigned to each world in that proposition.5 The worlds in which the subject
has non-zero credences are the worlds she thinks might be hers, or her doxastic worlds.
When we generalize to de se beliefs, the space of possibilities becomes the space of
centered worlds. The credence function takes centered worlds as arguments, and assigns
to each centered world a credence. The credence assigned to a centered proposition is
the sum of the credences assigned to each centered world in that centered proposition.
The centered worlds in which the subject has non-zero credences are the centered worlds
she thinks might be hers, or her doxastic alternatives.
Let’s look at the dynamics of de dicto belief. At the core of an account of belief
is an updating rule, a rule for generating new credences. The canonical updating rule
is conditionalization. For simplicity let’s focus on standard conditionalization, ignoring
Jeffrey conditionalization and the like.6
On standard conditionalization you generate your current credences from your prior
credences and your current evidence. To get your new credences you take your prior
credences, set the credence in every world incompatible with your evidence to 0, and
then normalize the credences in the remaining doxastic worlds; i.e., adjust the values
such that they sum to 1, and such that the ratios between them are the same as the
ratios between their prior credences. This way of updating makes certainties permanent.
This is because you can only lose doxastic worlds in this process, not gain them. Being
certain of a proposition P entails that all of your current doxastic worlds are compatible
with P , and if you only lose doxastic worlds when you update then all of your future
doxastic worlds will be compatible with P as well.
There is another version of de dicto conditionalization that does not have this conse-
quence. For lack of a better name, call it new conditionalization. On new conditionaliza-
tion, the role of prior credences in standard conditionalization is played by hypothetical
priors. Hypothetical priors are a fixed set of values that encode a subject’s epistemic
norms; we can think of hypothetical priors as the credences a subject should have if
she had no evidence whatsoever. On new conditionalization you generate your current
credences from your hypothetical priors and your current evidence. To get your new
credences you take your hypothetical priors, set the credence in every world incompati-
ble with your evidence to 0, and then normalize the credences in the remaining doxastic
worlds; i.e., adjust the values such that they sum to 1, and such that the ratios between
them are the same as the ratios between their hypothetical priors.
Unlike standard conditionalization, new conditionalization does not make certainties
5Throughout the paper I’ll ignore the complications that arise when we consider uncountably infinite
numbers of worlds, and which we need measure theory to properly address.
6See Howson and Urbach (1993) for a description of Jeffrey conditionalization.
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permanent, since subjects can lose and gain doxastic worlds. If your current evidence
is compatible with worlds that your previous evidence was not, then you gain doxastic
worlds when you update. This can happen, for example, when a subject suffers memory
loss. If you have a perfect memory then your current evidence will include your memory
of the previous evidence you’ve received, and you’ll usually continue to rule out possibil-
ities that you’ve ruled out in the past.7 But if you forget evidence that ruled out certain
worlds, then your current evidence will no longer rule those worlds out.
How should we generalize conditionalization to de se beliefs? As we saw in section 1,
we cannot simply start with standard conditionalization and replace the space of worlds
with the space of centered worlds. In the context of de se beliefs we both gain and lose
possibilities, but standard conditionalization only allows the loss of possibilities.
We get a more promising account if we start with new conditionalization and re-
place worlds with centered worlds. Call this version of de se conditionalization centered
conditionalization. On centered conditionalization you generate your current credences
from your hypothetical priors and your current evidence. To get your new credences
you take your hypothetical priors in centered worlds, set the credence in every centered
world incompatible with your evidence to 0, and then normalize the credences in the
remaining doxastic alternatives; i.e., adjust the values such that they sum to 1, and
such that the ratios between them are the same as the ratios between their hypothetical
priors.
Centered conditionalization is one way to modify new conditionalization in order
to account for de se beliefs. However, centered conditionalization and unmodified new
conditionalization are incompatible. To see this, consider a subject with just two doxastic
worlds, A and B, with two doxastic alternatives at each world. Assume that her credences
are divided equally among alternatives, so that her credence in each alternative is 1
4
and
her credence in each world is 1
2
. What should her credences in worlds A and B be if
one of her alternatives at A is eliminated? According to new conditionalization her
credences in A and B should remain 1
2
/1
2
. Her evidence hasn’t eliminated any doxastic
worlds, so new conditionalization will assign the same credences. According to centered
conditionalization, on the other hand, her credences in A and B should change. After
the alternative at A is eliminated, centered conditionalization redistributes this credence
among alternatives, so that her credence in each alternative is 1
3
. Since she has one
alternative at A and two alternatives at B, her credence in A should now be 1
3
and her
credence in B should now be 2
3
.
There is another way to modify new conditionalization in order to accommodate de
se beliefs that avoids this conflict. I’ll call it compartmentalized conditionalization. On
compartmentalized conditionalization you use new conditionalization to assign your cre-
dence in worlds, and then you distribute your credence in each world equally among the
alternatives at that world. So on compartmentalized conditionalization, your credences
are determined by your priors and your current evidence. Recall that your priors, like
any probability function, are additive, so your prior in a world is the sum of your priors
7There can be exceptions to this if there are centered worlds that (i) you have a non-zero prior in,
(ii) are subjectively identical to your current state of perfectly remembering your past evidence, and
(iii) are located at worlds which you had previously eliminated.
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in the centered worlds at that world. Given your priors and current evidence, you can
determine your new credences in three steps. First, you take your hypothetical priors,
and set the credence in every centered world incompatible with your current evidence to
0. Second, you normalize the credences in the remaining doxastic worlds; i.e., adjust the
values assigned to each doxastic world such that they sum to 1, and such that the ratios
between them are the same as the ratios between their priors. Finally, you distribute
the credence assigned to each world equally among the remaining doxastic alternatives
at that world.8 So alternatives at the same world will always have the same credences,
even if their priors are different.
In this paper I’ll look at three accounts of the sleeping beauty case: my account,
Elga’s account and Lewis’ account. An account of sleeping beauty requires an updat-
ing rule for de se beliefs, as well as further constraints on a subject’s credences. The
account I’m defending in this paper employs compartmentalized conditionalization and
the Principal Principle. Elga’s and Lewis’ accounts both employ centered conditional-
ization as their updating rule, but differ on the other principles they adopt. We’ll see
what additional principles Elga’s and Lewis’ accounts employ in sections 5 and 6.
3 Continuity
3.1 Continuity and the Passage of Time
The dynamics of de se beliefs raise questions about belief continuity which don’t arise
in de dicto contexts. Consider again the case presented in the introduction, where a
subject is watching a clock she knows to be accurate. When the clock changes from 9
am to 9:01 am, the subject discards all of her alternatives at which it’s 9 am and replaces
them with alternatives at which it’s 9:01 am. It seems that her credence in these new
alternatives should bear some relation to her credence in the alternatives they’ve just
replaced. But nothing we’ve said so far requires that this be the case.
Suppose, for example, that the subject watching the clock has only two doxastic
worlds, A and B, and that she has only one doxastic alternative at each world. Further
suppose that she updates her beliefs using centered conditionalization and that at 9 am
her priors in her two alternatives (A(9:00) and B(9:00)) are equal, so her credences in
A(9:00) and B(9:00) are 1
2
/1
2
. When she sees the clock register 9:01 am, what should her
credences in A(9:01) and B(9:01) be? Intuitively, they should be 1
2
/1
2
. But there is no
reason they have to be this way. Although her priors in A(9:00) and B(9:00) are equal,
at 9:01 am these are no longer her alternatives. Her alternatives are now B(9:01) and
B(9:01), and nothing forces her to have equal priors in these alternatives.
8In extreme situations one can imagine subjects who have an infinite number of alternatives at a
given world. In such cases the above prescription to divide the credence assigned to the world equally
among the alternatives at that world won’t do. Since Elga’s and Lewis’ accounts both endorse Elga’s
indifference principle (see section 5) this problem afflicts all three of the accounts I look at in this
paper. For uncountably infinite numbers of alternatives, the natural move is to employ measure theory
and adopt some suitably uniform measure over the alternatives. For countably infinite numbers of
alternatives the situation is more difficult; employing a non-standard measure that rejects countable
sub-additivity might be the best bet.
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For subjects like us, who have a sense of time passing, every belief change will include
a time changing component. As we notice time pass, we replace our old alternatives with
new ones located at a later time. Since every evidential change brings an awareness that
time has passed, every belief change involves the replacement of old alternatives with
new ones. Nothing we’ve said so far entails that the beliefs of such subjects will be in any
way constant—that their credences won’t fluctuate wildly simply due to the passage of
time—unless we impose further constraints on their credences. We intuitively think that
there should be such constraints; constraints which require a rational subject’s beliefs
to be diachronically coordinated in the appropriate way. I’ll call constraints of this kind
Continuity Principles.
A Continuity Principle will take the following form: a subject’s credences in her
alternatives before and after a belief change should be diachronically coordinated when
those alternatives are suitably related. For convenience, call a new and an old alternative
whose credences should be diachronically coordinated continuous alternatives. To obtain
a specific Continuity Principle we need to answer two questions. First, how should the
credences of a pair of continuous alternatives be related? Second, when are a pair of
alternatives continuous?
Let’s start with the first question. Consider again the case of a subject watching
a clock. In this case we’re naturally inclined to assume that her A(9:00) and B(9:00)
alternatives are continuous with her A(9:01) and B(9:01) alternatives, respectively. In-
tuitively what does this entail about her credences in these alternatives? It seems as if
her credences in the new alternatives should be the same as her credence in the earlier
alternatives they’re continuous with. So if her credences in A(9:00) and B(9:00) are 1
2
/1
2
,
it seems her credences in A(9:01) and B(9:01) should be 1
2
/1
2
as well.
Of course, we don’t want to require that credences in continuous alternatives always
be the same. Suppose that at 9:01 am the subject learns ¬B, and so has only one
alternative at 9:01 am, A(9:01). A(9:01) is continuous with A(9:00), but her credence in
A(9:01) should be 1, not 1
2
. What we want is not for continuous alternatives to always
have the same credences, but for continuous alternatives to have the same credences in
similar evidential situations.
We can cash out this intuition more precisely as follows. Consider a pair of al-
ternatives, A1 and A2, and an arbitrary set of centered worlds S not containing A1
and A2. Let cr(A1 : A1 ∨ S) be one’s credence in A1 if one’s evidence is the centered
proposition A1 ∨ S. Then if A1 and A2 are continuous, it should be the case that
cr(A1 : A1 ∨ S) = cr(A2 : A2 ∨ S). I.e., given otherwise identical evidence, A1 and A2
should be assigned the same credences. As we’ll see in the next section, for the dynamics
we’re looking at this will yield the desired result that the subject’s credence in A(9:01)
and B(9:01) should be 1
2
/1
2
.
Let’s turn to the second question: when are a pair of alternatives continuous? Re-
member where the issue of continuity arises. For subjects like us, who have a sense of
time passing, every belief change involves the replacement of old alternatives at a world
with new ones. And it seems that our credences in these replacements should, if they’re
relevantly similar, be diachronically coordinated with our credences in the originals. So
when we ask whether a pair of alternatives are relevantly similar, we’re asking about
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pairs where one is an old alternative, the other is a new alternative, and one replaces the
other at a world. Restricting our attention to these kinds of cases gives us a necessary
condition for continuity between alternatives: one of them must replace the other at a
world.9
Is this condition sufficient as well as necessary? It isn’t clear. Consider a subject
about to undergo duplication. Before duplication she has one doxastic alternative at each
of her doxastic worlds. After duplication she’ll have two alternatives, one centered on the
original individual and one centered on the duplicate. How should her credences in these
two new alternatives be related to her credence in her original alternative? When we
consider the original individual, it seems that the new alternative should be continuous
with the old alternative she had before duplication, since it’s just its temporal successor.
But it’s less clear what to think when we consider the duplicate individual. Should this
new alternative be continuous with the old alternative of the original individual? I think
it’s not obvious what to say.
There are a number of other hard cases to consider, such as cases of fission, fusion,
the addition and elimination of alternatives located at different times, and so on. These
cases make it difficult to spell out precise necessary and sufficient conditions for the
continuity of alternatives. Other than the necessary condition given above, I won’t take
a stand in this paper on what the criteria for continuity should be. Instead, I’ll allow for
a variety of Continuity Principles, differing in what standard of continuity they employ.
In the rest of this paper I’ll assume that the subjects in question have a sense of
time passing. As a result, several of the arguments I’ll look at will require a Continuity
Principle of some kind. In these places, I’ll point out what standards of continuity are
required for these arguments to go through.
3.2 Continuity and Dynamics
A Continuity Principle requires that we have diachronically coordinated credences in
pairs of suitably related alternatives. I’ve left open the question of when pairs of alter-
natives are suitably related, but we can avoid making decisions about this by looking
at a generic Continuity Principle. A Continuity Principle places a constraint on our
credences. For the kinds of dynamics we looked at in section 2, this translates into
a constraint on hypothetical priors. Since different dynamics generate credences from
priors in different ways, how constraints on credences translate into constraints on pri-
ors will depend on the dynamics in question. Let’s see what constraints on priors are
imposed by a generic Continuity Principle given the two dynamics for de se beliefs we
looked at in section 2, centered and compartmentalized conditionalization.
First, let’s look at centered conditionalization. Recall that in otherwise identical ev-
idential situations continuous alternatives should have the same credences. On centered
conditionalization, a subject’s credences are distributed among her doxastic alternatives
in proportion to their priors. If one of two continuous alternatives has a different prior
9That is, (i) the new and old alternatives should be located at the same world, (ii) the subject had
a non-zero credence in the old alternative before but not after the belief change, and (iii) the subject
has a non-zero credence in the new alternative after but not before the belief change.
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than its partner, then in otherwise identical evidential situations it will have a different
proportion of the total priors, and therefore a different credence. So on centered condi-
tionalization, the Continuity Principle requires continuous alternatives to have the same
priors.10
What about compartmentalized conditionalization? On compartmentalized condi-
tionalization, a subject’s credences are distributed among worlds in proportion to her
priors in those worlds, and then divided equally among the alternatives at each world.
Now consider an evidential situation containing one of two continuous alternatives, and
an otherwise identical evidential situation containing its continuous partner instead.
These two evidential situations have the same doxastic worlds and the same number
of alternatives at each world. So on compartmentalized conditionalization the credence
assigned to an alternative at a world will be the same in both evidential situations, and
since continuous alternatives are located at the same world, they’ll be assigned the same
credence. So if we adopt compartmentalized conditionalization we don’t need to adopt
a Continuity Principle; the diachronic coordination of our credences falls right out of
the dynamics!
Compartmentalized conditionalization offers another advantage. We saw in section
3.1 that it’s hard to give a precise characterization of when pairs of alternatives should
be continuous. If we adopt compartmentalized conditionalization, we don’t need to
worry about this. Recall the necessary condition for a pair of alternatives being con-
tinuous: one replaces the other at a world. On compartmentalized conditionalization,
any pair of alternatives that satisfies this necessary condition will have diachronically
coordinated credences. So we don’t need to worry about when pairs of alternatives are
continuous, because any pair of alternatives that plausibly could be continuous—that
satisfy the obvious necessary condition—will automatically have diachronically coordi-
nated credences.
Let’s look at an example of how compartmentalized conditionalization imposes di-
achronic coordination on our credences, and how centered conditionalization does not.
Consider again the subject who is watching a clock she knows to be accurate, and who
has two doxastic worlds, A and B. At 9 am she has one doxastic alternative at each
world, A(9:00) and B(9:00), and has equal credence in each. When she sees the clock
register 9:01 am she’ll replace each of her 9 am alternatives with a 9:01 am alternative.
What do centered and compartmentalized conditionalization require of her credences in
these alternatives?
If she’s a centered conditionalizer, the fact that her credences in A(9:00) and B(9:00)
are equal entails that her priors in A(9:00) and B(9:00) must be equal. But this doesn’t
say anything about her priors, and thus her credences, in A(9:01) or B(9:01). So if she’s
a centered conditionalizer her credences in her 9:01 am alternatives can be completely
unrelated to those of her 9 am alternatives.
If she’s a compartmentalized conditionalizer, the fact that her credences in A(9:00)
and B(9:00) are equal entails that her priors in worlds A and B are equal, although her
10With one exception: if the subject has a zero prior in every centered world except the two under
consideration, then they will be assigned the same credence (one) in otherwise identical evidential
situations regardless of their priors.
8
priors in the centered worlds A(9:00) and B(9:00) may not be. This doesn’t say anything
about her priors in A(9:01) or B(9:01), of course, but it doesn’t matter. Her credences in
A(9:01) and B(9:01) will be 1
2
/1
2
regardless of their priors, since her credences in A and
B will be 1
2
/1
2
, and A(9:01) and B(9:01) are the only alternatives at A and B. So if she’s
a compartmentalized conditionalizer she’ll have diachronically coordinated credences,
even though we haven’t imposed any restrictions on her priors.
On centered conditionalization we need to invoke special purpose Continuity Princi-
ples in order to account for the diachronic coordination of our credences, and we need to
work out an account of when pairs of alternatives are continuous. On compartmental-
ized conditionalization the diachronic coordination of our credences falls right out of the
dynamics, and we don’t need to bother providing an account of when alternatives are
continuous. This is a substantial mark in favor of compartmentalized conditionalization.
4 Sleeping Beauty
An interesting case of de se belief change is the sleeping beauty case:
The Sleeping Beauty Case: Some researchers are going to put you to sleep for sev-
eral days. They will put you to sleep on Sunday night, and then flip a coin. If heads
comes up they will wake you up on Monday morning. If tails comes up they will
wake you up on Monday morning and Tuesday morning, and in-between Monday
and Tuesday, while your are sleeping, they will erase the memories of your waking.
When you wake up there is no way for you to know if it is Monday or Tuesday. If you
are in the world in which the coin came up heads, then it’s Monday. If you are in the
world in which the coin came up tails, then it may be Monday or Tuesday. Suppose you
then learn that it’s Monday. Then you’ll know what day it is, but you still won’t know
whether the coin came up heads or tails. There are two questions to ask here. First,
what should your credences be when you wake up? Second, what should your credences
be if you learn that it’s Monday?
Let’s look at what my account says. Assume the Principal Principle, that a subject’s
credences should line up with what she thinks the chances are (if she’s not in possession
of inadmissible information).11 On compartmentalized conditionalization a subject first
divides her credences among worlds, and then divides the credence of each world equally
among the alternatives at that world. So a subject’s credence in worlds, and thus in de
dicto propositions, only changes when she gains or loses doxastic worlds.
On Sunday you will have a 1
2
/1
2
credence that the coin toss came up heads/tails by
the Principal Principle, with one doxastic alternative at each of your doxastic worlds.
When you wake up on Monday you have one alternative (Monday) at each heads world
and two alternatives (Monday and Tuesday) at each tails world. But although your dox-
astic alternatives have changed, you have the same doxastic worlds you had on Sunday.
Since your doxastic worlds have remained the same, you will have the same credence
in heads/tails: 1
2
/1
2
. How should your 1
2
credence in tails be divided between Monday
11See Lewis (1980).
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and Tuesday? On compartmentalized conditionalization your credence in tails is divided
equally between these two alternatives, so your credence in Monday/Tuesday given tails
will be 1
4
/1
4
.
What if you then learn that it’s Monday? This eliminates the Tuesday alternative
at your tails worlds, but doesn’t eliminate any doxastic worlds. So again, your credence
in heads/tails will remain the same: 1
2
/1
2
.
What do Elga and Lewis say about the sleeping beauty case? Elga (2000) proposes
that upon waking we should have a 1
3
credence in heads and a 2
3
credence in tails,
the latter split evenly between Monday and Tuesday. If you learn that it’s Monday, you
should be a centered conditionalizer and regain your original 1
2
/1
2
credence in heads/tails.
Lewis (2001) proposes that we retain our 1
2
/1
2
credence in heads/tails when we wake
up, with our credence in tails split evenly between Monday and Tuesday. Lewis’ account
diverges from my account in what happens when you learn that it’s Monday. Lewis holds
that you should be a centered conditionalizer and come to have a 2
3
credence in heads
and a 1
3
credence in tails.
Consider a subject with more than one doxastic world, who undergoes a belief change
which just increases or decreases the number of alternatives at a world (to a minimum
of 1). As we’ll see, we can capture the flavor of these three accounts by looking at how
such a belief change affects the subject’s credence in that world. On my account the
subject’s credence remains unchanged. On Lewis’ account, if the number of alternatives
at that world increases then the subject’s credence will remain unchanged. But if the
number of alternatives at that world decreases, then the subject’s credence will decrease
as well. On Elga’s account the subject’s credence will change in both cases. If the
number of alternatives at that world increases or decreases, then the subject’s credence
in that world will likewise increase or decrease.
In the next two sections I’ll look in more detail at how Elga and Lewis treat the
sleeping beauty case. Before we do that, a caveat is in order. Neither Elga nor Lewis
offer an explicit account of the dynamics of de se beliefs they endorse. So in presenting
Elga’s and Lewis’ arguments I’ve had to add implicit premises that their arguments
require. That said, I take the accounts I offer on their behalf to be fair.
5 Elga’s Response to Sleeping Beauty
In Elga’s (2000) account of the sleeping beauty case, he proposes that after waking up
our credence in heads/tails should be 1
3
/2
3
, the latter split evenly between Monday and
Tuesday. If we then learn it’s Monday, he proposes that our credence in heads/tails
should become 1
2
/1
2
. Elga’s proposal follows from four principles:
1. Centered Conditionalization
2. The Principal Principle
3. Elga’s Indifference Principle
4. A Continuity Principle
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We’ve already looked at centered conditionalization, and the Principal Principle is
familiar. The third principle, Elga’s (2004) Indifference Principle, states that your cre-
dences in doxastic alternatives at the same world should be equal.12 The fourth principle
is a Continuity Principle. As we’ve seen, the content of a Continuity Principle depends
on when we take pairs of alternatives to be continuous. For Elga’s proposal, any Conti-
nuity Principle the includes the the following sufficient condition for continuity will do:
a new and old alternative are continuous if (i) both are centered at the same world and
individual, (ii) the new alternative is centered at a later time than the old alternative,
and (iii) there’s no other new alternative satisfying (i) and (ii) that’s centered at an
earlier time.
Given these four principles, Elga’s proposal follows. Let cr(·) be your credence func-
tion and hp(·) your hypothetical priors. Let H/T be the propositions that the coin
came up heads/tails, and SUN/MON/TUE be the centered propositions that it’s Sun-
day/Monday/Tuesday.
By the Principal Principle, your credences in your heads and tails alternatives on
Sunday will be cr(H∧SUN) = cr(T∧SUN) = 1
2
. Given centered conditionalization, this
entails that hp(H∧SUN) = hp(T∧SUN). When you wake up on Monday, your Sunday
alternatives are replaced by Monday alternatives at the heads worlds, and by Monday
and Tuesday alternatives at the tails worlds. Both the Monday and the Tuesday alterna-
tives are centered at the same worlds and individuals as the Sunday alternatives, and at
later times. But the Monday alternatives are centered at an earlier time than the Tues-
day alternatives. So according to the Continuity Principle given above, it’s the Monday
(not Tuesday) alternatives that are continuous with the Sunday alternatives. We saw in
section 3 that given centered conditionalization, the Continuity Principle requires that
the priors of continuous alternatives be the same. So hp(H∧SUN) = hp(H∧MON) and
hp(T∧SUN) = hp(T∧MON). Elga’s Indifference Principle requires that your credences
in the two alternatives at the tails worlds be equal, and given centered conditionaliza-
tion this entails that hp(T∧MON) = hp(T∧TUE). Putting these equalities together,
we get hp(H∧MON) = hp(H∧SUN) = hp(T∧SUN) = hp(T∧MON) = hp(T∧TUE).
When you wake up your doxastic possibilities are H∧MON, T∧MON and T∧TUE, so
on centered conditionalization your credences after waking on Monday are cr(H∧MON)
= cr(T∧MON) = cr(T∧TUE) = 1
3
.
Now, say you’re woken up at 9 am. What if at 9:01 am you learn that it’s Monday?
After learning it’s Monday you will have one alternative at each world, H∧MON(9:01)
at the heads worlds and T∧MON(9:01) at the tails worlds. By the Continuity Principle,
hp(H∧MON(9:00)) = hp(H∧MON(9:01)) and hp(T∧MON(9:00)) = hp(T∧MON(9:01)).
We know from above that hp(H∧MON(9:00)) = hp(T∧MON(9:00)), so it follows that
hp(H∧MON(9:01)) = hp(T∧MON(9:01)). So on centered conditionalization your cre-
dences after learning it’s Monday are cr(H∧MON(9:01)) = cr(T∧MON(9:01)) = 1
2
.
12Elga (2004) proposes that subjectively indistinguishable alternatives at the same world should have
the same credences. I’m assuming that one’s current evidence includes (and is possibly exhausted by)
one’s current subjective state. It follows that all of one’s alternatives are subjectively indistinguishable,
and Elga’s Indifference Principle becomes the claim that alternatives at the same world should have the
same credences.
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Note that the Principal Principle only plays a superficial role in the argument for
Elga’s proposal. The Principal Principle sets our credences in heads and tails on Sunday
to 1
2
/1
2
. But the argument goes through equally well given any reason for 1
2
/1
2
credences
in heads and tails on Sunday. Likewise, the argument goes through just as well if heads
and tails are replaced by two different hypotheses we have other reasons for having 1
2
/1
2
credences in.
In the sleeping beauty case it’s uncontentious that the Principal Principle applies
on Sunday, and thus that you should have 1
2
/1
2
credences in heads and tails. Some of
the sleeping beauty literature has focused on whether the Principal Principle should
also apply after you wake up on Monday.13 The question is whether you get admissible
evidence when you wake up on Monday. If so, the thought goes, then the Principal
Principle should still apply, and your credences in heads and tails should remain 1
2
/1
2
.
It follows from Elga’s argument that upon waking our credences in heads and tails
should be 1
3
/2
3
. So if Elga’s argument is sound, you do get inadmissible evidence when
you wake up on Monday. But I think debating admissibility and the Principal Principle
is the wrong way to approach the problem. First, there is no agreement as to what counts
as admissible evidence.14 This makes it hard to make progress in a debate over whether
someone’s evidence is admissible. Second, focusing on the issue of whether the Principal
Principle applies on Monday gets us relatively little. As we just saw, the argument goes
through just as well if heads and tails are replaced by two different hypotheses we have
other reasons for having 1
2
/1
2
credences in. Concluding one thing or another about the
Principal Principle doesn’t tell us what to say in these other cases. Finally, suppose
we decide that we don’t receive inadmissible evidence upon waking, and therefore that
Elga’s argument is incorrect. We still need to decide what part of Elga’s argument
to reject, since the argument entails the 1
3
/2
3
result without making any assumptions
about the admissibility of your evidence on Monday. The argument only requires that
the Principal Principle hold on Sunday, before you go to sleep. Given this, I think it’s
better to assess the merits of Elga’s argument and then see what implications this has
regarding admissibility than to use admissibility to assess the merits of Elga’s argument.
If one accepts Elga’s argument, then belief changes that increase the number of
doxastic alternatives at a world will generally increase one’s credence in that world
relative to worlds without such an increase. Likewise, one’s credence in a proposition
which multiplies doxastic alternatives will generally increase relative to propositions
that don’t multiply alternatives. One can see why this should be so for the proponent of
Elga’s response: to endorse Elga’s response is to think that one’s credence in tails should
increase relative to one’s credence in heads when the number of alternatives given tails
increases (and the number of alternatives given heads does not).
However, accepting Elga’s argument leads to counterintuitive consequences. Consider
the following case, which I owe to Tim Maudlin:
13See Lewis (2001) and Dorr (2002).
14Though see Hall (2004) and Meacham (2005) for proposals regarding admissibility.
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The Many Brains Argument: Consider the hypothesis that you’re a brain in a vat.
I take it that this is epistemically possible and (perhaps) nomologically possible.
Your current credence in this possibility, however, is presumably very low. Now
consider the proposition that you’re in a world where brains in vats are constantly
being constructed in states subjectively indistinguishable from your own. Let your
credence in this proposition be 0 < p < 1, and your credence that there will be no
multiplication of doxastic alternatives be 1−p. If you accept Elga’s argument then
your credence in this hypothesis should be constantly increasing and will converge
to 1. Thus, if you hold such a position you should come to believe (if not yet, then
in a little while) that these brains in vats are being created.
It follows from Elga’s Indifference Principle that your credences should be spread evenly
among the doxastic alternatives at a world. So as you become certain that these brains
in vats are being created, you should become certain that you’re a brain in a vat.
The many brains argument assumed that brain in a vat duplication is the only
proposition in which you have a non-zero credence that multiplies doxastic alternatives.
Now suppose that you also have a small credence in the proposition that you’re in a
world where duplicates of you are constantly being created on distant but qualitatively
identical planets. Then you’ll come to believe (if not yet, then in a little while) that these
brains in the vats are being created or that these duplicates of you are being created.
Likewise, you’ll come to believe that you are a brain in a vat or a duplicate on a distant
planet. By a similar process, you can generalize the result of the many brains argument
to any number of propositions that multiply alternatives.
In general, if you accept Elga’s argument then you will come to believe that you’re
in a world where you have many doxastic alternatives. These are strange worlds. So if
we accept Elga’s argument, we’ll come to believe (if not yet, then in a little while) that
we live in a strange world. This is an unwelcome consequence.
6 Lewis’ Response to Sleeping Beauty
In his criticism of Elga’s account of sleeping beauty, Lewis (2001) claims that you do
not receive inadmissible evidence when you wake up on Monday. Thus the Principal
Principle should still apply on Monday, and your credence in heads/tails should remain
1
2
/1
2
. I’ve said above why I think this is the wrong way to approach the problem. And
as we saw, even if Lewis is right there remains the task of deciding what’s wrong with
Elga’s argument, since the argument only requires that the Principal Principle apply
on Sunday. So how would Lewis address Elga’s argument? To reject the argument,
Lewis needs to reject one of the four premises the argument employs. With Elga, Lewis
accepts that the Principal Principle entails that our credences in heads and tails on
Sunday should be 1
2
/1
2
. Furthermore, Lewis endorses Elga’s Indifference Principle and
(centered) conditionalization. So Lewis must reject Elga’s Continuity Principle.
In Lewis’ (2001) account of the sleeping beauty case, he proposes that after waking
up our credence in heads/tails should be 1
2
/1
2
, the latter split evenly between Monday
and Tuesday. If we then learn it’s Monday, he proposes that our credence in heads/tails
should become 2
3
/1
3
. Lewis’ proposal follows from five principles:
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1. Centered Conditionalization
2. The Principal Principle
3. Elga’s Indifference Principle
4. A Continuity Principle
5. The No-Increase Principle
The first three premises are familiar. The fourth premise is another Continuity
Principle. Although Lewis must reject Elga’s Continuity Principle, we can use it to
characterize a Continuity Principle that will suit Lewis’ purposes. Elga’s Continuity
Principle requires that any old and new alternative that satisfy the following conditions
be continuous: (i) both are centered at the same world and individual, (ii) the new
alternative is centered at a later time than the old alternative, and (iii) there’s no
other new alternative satisfying (i) and (ii) that’s centered at an earlier time. Lewis’
Continuity Principle requires that any pair of alternatives that satisfies these conditions
be continuous iff the number of alternatives at that world has not increased.
Lewis’ Continuity Principle needs to deny that pairs of alternatives that satisfy these
conditions are continuous when the number of alternatives at that world increases. This
leaves us with the question of what constraints, if any, should be imposed on your
credences at worlds where the number of alternatives increases. Lewis’ position seems
to be that in cases where you don’t get evidence about the world—where you don’t gain
or lose doxastic worlds—increases in the number of alternatives at a world should leave
your credence in that world unchanged. I’ll call this the No-Increase Principle.
Given these five principles, Lewis’ proposal follows. As before, the Principal Princi-
ple and centered conditionalization entail that hp(H∧SUN) = hp(T∧SUN). When you
wake up on Monday your Sunday alternatives are replaced by Monday alternatives at
the heads worlds and by Monday and Tuesday alternatives at the tails worlds. By
the Continuity Principle your Sunday alternatives at your heads worlds are continuous
with your Monday alternatives at your heads worlds, and on centered conditionaliza-
tion this entails that hp(H∧SUN) = hp(H∧MON).15 By the No-Increase Principle the
increase in alternatives at your tails worlds leaves your credence in tails unchanged,
so your credence in tails after waking up on Monday is the same as your credence in
tails on Sunday. Given centered conditionalization, this entails that hp(T∧SUN) =
hp(T∧(MON∨TUE)) = hp(T∧MON) + hp(T∧TUE). Elga’s Indifference Principle and
centered conditionalization entail that hp(T∧MON) = hp(T∧TUE). Taken together,
these equalities entail hp(H∧MON) = hp(H∧SUN) = hp(T∧SUN) = hp(T∧MON)
+ hp(T∧TUE) = 2·hp(T∧MON) = 2·hp(T∧TUE). When you wake up your doxas-
tic possibilities are H∧MON, T∧MON and T∧TUE, so on centered conditionalization
your credences after waking up on Monday are cr(H∧MON) = 1
2
and cr(T∧MON) =
cr(T∧TUE) = 1
4
.
Now what if you’re woken up at 9 am and told at 9:01 am that it’s Monday? After
learning it’s Monday you will have one alternative at each world, and by the Continuity
15We can actually derive one’s credences after waking on Monday without using the Continuity
Principle. But (a) the Continuity Principle is required for the derivation of what your credences should
be if you then learn it’s Monday, and (b) using it in this derivation as well makes things a bit clearer.
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Principle these alternatives will be continuous with your Monday 9 am alternatives, i.e.,
hp(H∧MON(9:00)) = hp(H∧MON(9:01)) and hp(T∧MON(9:00)) = hp(T∧MON(9:01)).
We know from above that hp(H∧MON(9:00)) = 2·hp(T∧MON(9:00)), so it follows that
hp(H∧MON(9:01)) = 2·hp(T∧MON(9:01)). So on centered conditionalization your cre-
dences after learning it’s Monday are cr(H∧MON(9:01)) = 2
3
and cr(T∧MON(9:01)) = 1
3
.
Elga’s account ran into problems because it entailed that belief changes that multi-
ply alternatives at a world generally increase one’s credence in that world. Lewis avoids
this result by adopting a different Continuity Principle and the No-Increase Principle.
But while on Lewis’ account belief changes that multiply alternatives at a world don’t
increase one’s credence in that world, belief changes that decrease the number of alter-
natives at a world generally do decrease one’s credence in that world. And this leads to
counterintuitive consequences for his account as well. Consider the following case:
The Sadistic Scientists Argument: Consider the hypothesis that you’re in a world
where every second some scientists will create n brains in vats in situations sub-
jectively identical to your own. A half second after the brains are created, the
scientists will destroy them. Let your credence in this proposition be 0 < p < 1,
and your credence that there will be no creation or destruction of doxastic alter-
natives be 1− p. When the brains are created your credence that you are in such
a world will remain the same (No-Increase Principle), and this credence will be
evenly split between your n+ 1 alternatives (Indifference Principle). As a half
second passes and these brains are destroyed, your credence that you are in such a
world will decrease by the appropriate amount (Continuity Principle and centered
conditionalization). So as each second passes, your credence that you are in such
a world will decrease and converge to 0. Thus, if you hold Lewis’ position you
should come to believe (if not yet, then in a little while) that these brains in vats
are not being created.
The sadistic scientists argument assumed that brain in vat destruction is the only
proposition you have a non-zero credence in that diminishes alternatives. Now suppose
that you also had a small credence in the proposition that duplicates of you on distant
but qualitatively identical worlds were being created and destroyed. Then you’d come to
believe (if not yet, then in a little while) that neither of these propositions was true. The
result generalizes to any number of propositions that diminish alternatives. In general,
if you accept Lewis’ argument then you’ll come to believe that you’re not in a world
where continual doxastic elimination is taking place.
I take this result to be counterintuitive. If the result as stated does not move you,
imagine a case in which you are living in a world where brain-in-a-vat creation technology
is cheap and easily accessible. An enemy of yours who would enjoy destroying brains
in vats in your subjective state tells you that at midnight she’ll spend an hour creating
n such brains, and at 1 am she’ll spend an hour destroying them. This enemy has the
resources to carry out this threat, and reliably carries out the threats she makes. If n is
big enough, and you uphold the Lewis’ account, then though you’re now almost certain
that she will carry out her threat, when you wake up tomorrow morning you’ll be almost
certain that she didn’t. Indeed, if n is big enough, you could even go with her and watch
as she creates the brains and destroys them; if you watch for long enough you won’t
believe your eyes!
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7 The Varied Brains Argument
In the last two sections I’ve argued that Elga’s and Lewis’ positions lead to counterin-
tuitive consequences. Now let’s turn a critical eye toward my account.
Consider a case like sleeping beauty, but with the following twist. If the coin toss
comes up tails, they’ll put you in a black room on Monday and a white room on Tuesday.
If the coin toss comes up heads, they’ll flip another coin to determine whether to put
you in a black or white room on Monday.
What should your credences be in this case on the three accounts we’ve looked at?
On all three accounts your credences in heads and tails on Sunday will be the same
as in the sleeping beauty case. Likewise, on all three accounts your credences in heads
and tails after waking up on Monday before you open your eyes will be the same as in
the sleeping beauty case. What about your credences in heads and tails after you open
your eyes and see a black room? On Elga’s and Lewis’ accounts your credences will
be the same: half of the heads worlds are eliminated and half of the tails alternatives
are eliminated, and after renormalizing you get the same credences in heads and tails
as before. Not so for compartmentalized conditionalization. When you eliminate half
of the heads worlds you distribute this credence among the other worlds, but when you
eliminate half of the tails alternatives you give that credence to the other alternative at
the same world. So when you open your eyes and see a black room, your credence in
tails worlds will increase, and your credence in heads/tails will become 1
3
/2
3
.
This raises a natural worry for my account. I offered the many brains argument as a
criticism of Elga’s 1
3
/2
3
response to the sleeping beauty case. In the black and white room
version of sleeping beauty compartmentalized conditionalization also ends up assigning
1
3
/2
3
credences to heads and tails. Is there an argument analogous to the many brains
argument against compartmentalized conditionalization?
Yes and no. Let’s look at how such an argument might go. The many brains
argument itself won’t work because on compartmentalized conditionalization multiplying
alternatives at a world doesn’t increase the likelihood of that world. As long as our
doxastic worlds remains the same, our credences in worlds will remain the same. To get
an argument analogous to the black and white room case, we need an argument where
the normal worlds are eliminated but the alternative multiplying worlds are not. So
consider the following case:
The Varied Brains Argument: Assume that your doxastic worlds are such that
they can be divided into two kinds of worlds, normal worlds and strange worlds.
Throughout your doxastic worlds there are n subjectively distinguishable experi-
ences that you might experience in the next second. Assume that you have some
normal doxastic world compatible with each experience, and you have no sub-
jective duplicates at your normal doxastic worlds. Assume that at each of your
strange doxastic worlds there are scientists that will create n brains in vats a sec-
ond from now, each brain compatible with one of your possible experiences. Now,
at the end of a second you’ll have some experience, say that of eating chocolate
ice cream. This will eliminate the many normal worlds in which you don’t have
the experience of eating chocolate ice cream. On the other hand, at all of your
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strange worlds there’s a brain in a vat which has the experience of eating choco-
late ice cream, so no strange worlds will be eliminated. By compartmentalized
conditionalization, your credence in your strange doxastic worlds should increase
relative to your credence in your normal doxastic worlds.
We can extend this case by replacing ‘second’ with longer units of time, and as the unit
of time grows larger, the number n of distinguishable experiences you might experience
grows larger as well. By making the unit of time arbitrarily large, we can get a case in
which, on compartmentalized conditionalization, your credence in your strange doxastic
worlds grows arbitrarily large.
How bad is this?
One might question whether this result is counterintuitive. This is an interesting, if
murky, question. But it is worth looking at how things stand if we decide that the result
is counterintuitive.
In the varied brains case, your credence in your strange worlds increases relative to
your credence in your normal worlds because of the artificial way in which these doxastic
worlds have been selected: all the strange worlds under consideration are ones that will
end up matching whatever you experience, whereas many of your normal worlds won’t
match what you experience. If we restricted the normal worlds to those compatible with
eating chocolate ice cream, your credence in your strange worlds would not increase
relative to your credence in your normal worlds. Likewise, if we placed no restrictions
on which strange worlds were allowed, then the experience of eating chocolate ice cream
would eliminate lots of strange worlds as well as lots of normal worlds. Whether your
credence in strange worlds increases relative to your credence in normal worlds depends
on which strange and normal worlds are your doxastic worlds—which worlds our priors
and evidence lead us to believe could be ours. And it’s reasonable to think that if you
have doxastic worlds like ours, your credence in strange worlds will not gain on your
credence in normal worlds.
Skeptical results can be roughly divided into two kinds. First, there are results which
entail that people like us in situations like ours should be lead to skepticism. Second,
there are results which entail skeptical consequences for people in outlandish situations,
but which have little bearing on people like us. I take it that the first kind of result
is worse than the second. Our general sentiment is that our intuitions in outlandish
situations are less reliable—and thus easier to discard—than our intuitions in situations
we’re familiar with. Likewise, it’s easier to bite the bullet with counterintuitive cases
that have little impact on our everyday lives.
The varied brains argument is a result of the second kind; it entails that people with
certain idiosyncratic doxastic set-ups will come to believe something counterintuitive.
The many brains argument, on the other hand, is a result of the first kind; it entails that
people like us should come to believe that we live in a strange world. So the skeptical
arguments considered weigh more heavily against Elga’s account than they do against
the account I favor.
What about the sadistic scientists argument? This too is a result of the second
kind. While people like us will become more and more sure we’re not in a ‘diminishing’
world, this will have little effect on overall belief distribution since our credences in such
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possibilities are so small. Only people whose initial credence in these strange worlds
are high will be lead to counterintuitive results. So the skeptical arguments, considered
in isolation, don’t leave us with a reason to favor the account I advocate over Lewis’
account. It is other considerations, such as the prima facie plausibility of the view, the
implications with regards to reflection and continuity, etc., that will decide between the
two views.
8 Why Compartmentalized Conditionalization?
We can sum up the intuitive difference between the three accounts with the following
case:
The Up-and-Down Case: Suppose you learn that you’ll be part of the following
experiment. Some scientists will flip a fair coin tonight. If it comes up tails, then
every day at noon the scientists will create n brains in vats in states subjectively
identical to yours, and at midnight will destroy n2 of them. If it comes up heads,
no brains will be created or destroyed.
If you endorse Elga’s account then your credence that the coin came up tails will converge
to 1, regardless of your evidence (knowledge of objective chances, etc.) to the contrary.
If you endorse Lewis’ account then your credence that the coin came up heads will
converge to 1, regardless of your evidence (knowledge of objective chances, etc.) to the
contrary. If you endorse my account, then your credences in heads and tails will remain
1
2
/1
2
.
In this paper I’ve offered two reasons to adopt the third option. First, the dynamics
of my account has a substantial advantage over the dynamics of Elga’s and Lewis’
with regards to accommodating the continuity of our beliefs. Accounts that adopt
centered conditionalization need to invoke special purpose Continuity Principles in order
to accommodate the diachronic coordination of our credences, and need to work out
when pairs of alternatives are continuous. Accounts that adopt compartmentalized
conditionalization get the diachronic coordination of our credences for free, and don’t
need to work out when alternatives are continuous. Second, I’ve shown that while
all three accounts arguably suffer from counterintuitive consequences, the consequences
faced by my account are better than those faced by Elga’s account, and no worse than
those faced by Lewis’ account.
These aren’t the only considerations relevant to the assessment of these three ac-
counts. There are further questions about betting arguments, reflection principles, and
the like.16 But if what I’ve said is right, these two considerations provide compelling
reasons in favor of my account.17
16See footnote 3 for some references to literature on these topics, and their bearing on my account.
17I’d like to thank Frank Arntzenius, Maya Eddon, Adam Elga, Hilary Greaves, John Hawthorne,
David Manley, Tim Maudlin, Adam Sennet, Ted Sider and Jonathon Weisberg for valuable comments
and discussion. In particular, I owe much to Tim Maudlin, who inspired my interest in these issues,
and David Manley, for raising the black and white room case. Finally, I owe a special thanks to John
Hawthorne, Maya Eddon, and Frank Arntzenius for comments on a number of drafts of this paper.
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